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ABSTRACT 
In the U.S. and U.K. markets, it is a common practice for 
financial institutions to issue notes, evidenced by some 
sort of transferrable marketable instruments; and the 
issuance is supported by a pool of bank loan assets as 
security. This type of transaction is commonly known as a 
securitisation programme 一 "securitise" in the sense that 
the product can be easily transferred in the secondary 
market, as securities are traded in the stock exchange. 
While the securitisaton programme has been in the U.S. 
market for more than twenty years, the concept is totally 
new in the Hong Kong banking world. The reasons for this 
are plentiful, but the main rationale is that banks were 
exposed to so many business opportunities that there was no 
apparent need for them to explore the viability of 七he 
securitisation programme. However, as many banks now are 
drawn to the attention of the capital adequacy ratio 
requirement as laid down by the Basle Committee, they find 
that a successful securitisation programme will help them 
to free up capital to other investments for an increasing 
return. And it is against such background that this paper 
is prepared. While the security that this paper covers is. 
related to the residential mortgage loans, which 
historically is a type of assets marked with low default 
risk with a satisfactory return, there is no reason why the 
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security cannot be replaced by other types of loan assets, 
such as credit card receivables, corporate loans and other 
loan products which are relatively sizable. 
The first sections of this paper review the rationale for 
launching the securitisation programme in Hong Kong. It 
then attempts to structure a securitisation programme of 
residential mortgage loans, taking into consideration the 
special issues and problems associated with the Hong Kong 
market. The paper concludes with a cost consideration to 
see whether it is economically feasible to launch such a 
programme in Hong Kong. It is hoped that this paper will 
stimulate further thoughts on the subject, with a hope to 
enhance the success of launching a securitisation programme 
in the Hong Kong market in future. 
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According to the Hong Kong Statistics, at the end of 1989, 
there were 165 licensed banks in Hong Kong, 134 of which 
are domiciled in countries outside Hong Kong. As they are 
holding restricted banking licenses, they can only open one 
single branch in Hong Kong. While these banks are actively 
providing conventional banking services and products, there 
are certain restrictions which hamper their business 
activities in certain sectors. One of these is the 
residential mortgage loan business, which has a number of 
special attributes highlighted as follows: 
1. Each individual loan size is relatively small, ranging 
from HKD25,000 to HKD2,000,000• In contrast, loans to 
commercial customers usually have an amount of at 
least HKD2-3 million. 
2. The loan period generally runs for at least 10 years, 
while commercial loans are usually subject to annual 
review. 
3. A residential mortgage loan is a relatively 
homogeneous product. The terms offered by various 
banks are very similar. in this respect, the 
individual customer will tend to select a bank which 
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can offer convenience and a trustworthy image. 
Preferably the bank should have an extensive network, 
with which the customer has opened an account already, 
and which is relatively well-known to the customer. 
Hence a customer would prefer to borrow from, say. 
Wing Lung Bank (which ranks 908 in terms of assets 
among all banks worldwide) than Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken (ranks 48 and is the largest bank in Sweden) • 
[The writer recognizes that such comparison is for 
reference only. Ranking in terms of assets is only 
one of the numerous methods to reflect the credit 
worthiness of banks.] 
Under these constraints, those restricted licensed banks 
that still wish to offer residential mortgage loans are 
faced with a technical problem such as the high 
establishment cost in setting up computer software, and 
difficulty in maintaining a pool of operational staff to 
handle the daily administration routine. 
For the above reasons, the 80/20 Principle is applicable, 
as over 80% of the local residential mortgage loan business 
is booked by a limited number of banks - including the two 
note-issuing banks (Hongkong & Shanghai Bank and Standard 
Chartered Bank), two major U.S. banks (Chase Manhattan and 
Citibank) and the Bank of China Group. These banks enjoy 
economies of scale from holding a large pool of homogeneous 
mortgage loan assets. 
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On 15th July, 1988, the Basle Committee on Banking 
Regulations and Supervisory Practices published its final 
report. It had developed a framework of compliance which 
all member banks in the international market are to follow. 
While a description of the intricacies of the mechanism is 
beyond the scope of this discussion, the consequence of the 
Basle Committee‘s action is that by 1992, every member bank 
in the world has to maintain a minimum capital adequacy 
ratio of 8%. To comply with this requirement (the "new BIS 
Standards"), banks can generally take two alternatives: 
either increase their capital base or to reduce their 
assets level. In today‘s market condition, many banks will 
find it difficult to raise additional capital to expand 
their equity base. Therefore, they will have to adopt the 
second alternative and reduce their portfolio of loan 
assets. While the lending climate tends to be very 
cautious nowadays, banks that wish to reduce their loan 
assets must offer loans with good quality, both in terms of 
credit worthiness and pricing, in order that these assets 
can meet satisfactory market reception. Accordingly, the 





The objectives of the research, as outlined in Chapter I, 
are: 
1. to identify the problems and issues faced by the bank 
in structuring a securitisation programme of 
residential mortgage loans in Hong Kong; 
2. to examine the ways and means adopted by the bank in 
dealing with these problems/issues; 
3. to propose solutions and recommendations for the 
launching of the programme in the local Hong Kong 
market. 
The present research is confronted with the difficulty of 
a lack of published literature on the subject. In 
addition, structured interviews were not possible as few 
banks would like to disclose their market strategies and 
distinctive observations for fear of loss of competitive 
advantage. However, to the extent practicable, the study 
will be based on data and information collected over the 
past 12 months. These include published and unpublished 
materials on the topic. Actual experiences will be relayed 
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extensively throughout the research to reflect the 
practical aspect of the subject. Considerations will be 
given to the special characteristics of the Hong Kong 
market in implementing the programme. 
The following research approach will be used: 
1. As a first step, based on the concept derived from the 
U.S. and the U.K. market, a general framework for the 
securitisation programme will be developed. 
2. The problems for each specific issue will then be 
spelled out and analysed. For example, what are the 
issues faced by the bank with respect to the tenor of 
the facility? What is the structure of the programme 
in order to satisfy the legal requirement? 
3. Certain features unique to the Hong Kong market will 
then be discussed. For example, what would be the 
impact, if any, of the 1997 issue on the programme. 
4. With these considerations, suggested alternative 
solutions for certain specific problems will be 
explored, and a revised programme will be developed. 
5. A cost analysis will be made to see whether it is 
justified to implement the programme. 
6. Lastly, recommendations will be made to the bank for 
improvements to enhance the success in launching the 
programme. The writer will endeavour to analyse the 
subject not only from the issuer's point of view, but 
also look at it from the angle of the buyers. This is 
made possible by discussions with major financial 
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institutions in the market which are interested to be 
involved one way or another in such programme. 
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CHAPTER III 
Development of the Securitisation Programme 
Assumed Objectives 
The objectives in securitising the mortgage portfolio are 
assumed to be as follows: 广, 
1. to move a part of the residential mortgage loans off-
balance sheet so as to improve the total return on 
capital; 
2. to achieve balance sheet liquidity by developing the 
ability to move a relatively sizable part of the 
mortgage portfolio in one single transaction, and 
3. to retain the economy up-side on the part of the 
mortgage portfolio sold. 
Basic Description of the Securitisation Process 
Securitisation involves the sale, transfer or assignment of 
part of the mortgage portfolio to a special purpose vehicle 
("SPV") domiciled outside Hong Kong. The SPV issues debt 
in one or more classes, the proceeds of which fund the 
purchase of the mortgage loans. In turn, the debt of the 
SPV is backed by the security of the mortgages. The SPV 
relies on the cashflow from the mortgage assets to service 
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the principal and interest payments it must make on its 
debt. 
With such background, we have developed a structure for the 
securitisation programme. The terms are highlighted as 
follows: 
Proposed Terms and Conditions 
Issuer : Special Purpose Vehicle ("SPV") 
Originator : A retail bank in Hong Kong with 
considerable level of activities 
in residential mortgage loan 
business 
Amount : A considerable amount, at least 
HKD400 million 
Currency : HK Dollars 
Form of Facility : Mortgage backed term loan facility 
with (the "Facility") transferable loan certificates 
Tranches : The Facility will be divided into 
two Tranches (to cater for the 
different risk/return preference 
of different investors)• Tranche 
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A will consist of around 30 一 35% 
of the total amount, whereas the 
remaining portion will be 
allotted to Tranche B. 
Maturity : Tranche A 
5 to 7 years 
Tranche B 
10 - 13 years 
Coupon : Tranche A 
Around 0.75% over the Hong Kong 
Interbank Offered Rate ("HIBOR") 
Tranche B 
Around 0.2% over the Prime Rate 
quoted by leading banks in Hong 
Kong from time to time 
Credit Enhancement : To be elaborated in subsequent 
sections 
Issue Price : Usually Par 
Fees : Consists of Placement Fees and 
Advisory Fees 
Listing ： None 
10 
Arranger ： A merchant bank in Hong Kong 




ELABORATION ON THE MECHANISM OF THE PROGRAMME 
The Issuer 
As described in the previous Chapter, one of the objectives 
of the Securitisation Programme is to achieve an off-
balance sheet effect on the mortgage loans. In this 
respect, it is imperative that the Issuer of the securities 
should be separated from the initiating bank. 
In this connection, a special purpose vehicle ("SPV") is 
established so that the loan assets purchased by this SPV 
will not appear in the balance sheet of the bank itself. 
Specifically, the entire issued share capital of the SPV 
will be held by a separate Trustee. in turn, the 
initiating bank will be granted a call option in which it 
is entitled to acquire back the issued share capital of the 
SPV from the Trustee on payment of a consideration of a 
minimal price (say, HKD10,000). Such call option will only 
be exercisable after the SPV has paid off all its debts. 
To minimise the tax burden, the SPV is intended to be 
incorporated in a tax haven such as Bermuda, British virgin 
Islands etc. The paid up capital will carry a minimal 
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value of HKD2, and the business activities of this SPV will 
be solely for the purchase and holding of the mortgage 
loans. 
The Originator, Amount and Currency 
The Securitisation Programme is going to be a costly 
exercise, considering the legal expense, the fees paid to 
the merchant bank and the establishment costs of the SPV 
and the Trustees. As such, the size of the Securitisation 
Programme should be large enough to justify the costs 
incurred. On the other hand, a given portfolio of loans 
should only represent a relatively small portion of the 
total mortgage loans held by the initiating bank, due to 
two main reasons. First of all, the initiating bank would 
only need to sell some of the assets to meet the new BIS 
standards. In addition, the market will also be alerted if 
the portion is too high, and investors will wonder if there 
is anything wrong with the mortgage loans in the portfolio. 
With this background, it would be fair to estimate that a 
total of 1,000 mortgage loans would be sufficient to cover 
the set-up and operation costs and to generate a reasonable 
return. Assuming that each loan has an average outstanding 
of HKD400,000 then the total amount of the Programme will 
be in the region of HKD400 million. Furthermore, the 
facility is denominated in Hong Kong dollars only, so as to 
avoid an exchange risks both for the Issuer and the final 
takers. 
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The Facility and the Availability of 
Various Tranches 
One of the attractions of the Securitisation Programme is 
that such a Programme allows transferability of the 
mortgage loans, as evidenced by the loan certificates. In 
this respect, the investors will not be tied in for a long 
term commitment, as in the case of the conventional loans. 
They will have liquidity since the loan certificates can be 
sold in the secondary market. 
- 广’ 
While the transferability feature should enhance market 
reception, there are still a considerable number of banks 
that show great concern on the 1997 issue. Most of these 
are foreign banks with relatively limited operations in 
Hong Kong, and are therefore more "able" to terminate their 
local business should market conditions fall on such 
adversity. On the other hand, there are other banks which, 
for one reason or another, are less concerned with the 1997 
issue. They rather prefer to book longer-term assets for 
a higher return. Recognising the different risk/return 
preferences of different banks, the Securitisation 
Programme consists of 2 different "Tranches"; the first 
Tranche is relatively shorter, with a maturity of around 6 
years. The second Tranche is relatively longer, maturing 
in 13 years time, in line with the maturity of the entire 
portfolio. 
The amount allocated to Tranches A and B are roughly 35% 
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and 65% of the total portfolio outstanding. The 
calculation is shown in Appendix I. 
In Appendix I, it is calculated that the "actual" portion 
allocated to Tranche A is 29% of the total size. But the 
writer had discussed the issue with a few leading retail 
banks in Hong Kong (including Citibank and Standard 
Chartered Bank) and was advised 七ha七 the average life of 
the residential mortgage loans was around 8 years. In 
other words, a substantial portion of the borrowers would 
tend to partially or fully prepay their respective loans 
before maturity as scheduled. Therefore it is fairly 
conservative to estimate that 35% of the mortgage loans are 
repaid (voluntary and under schedule) during the first six 
years. 
On this basis, there are three possibilities which may 
arise in 6 years after the Securitisation Programme is 
launched. The first scenario is that exactly 35% of the 
mortgage loans are repaid by the end of Year 6. In this 
case, the full Tranche A will be repaid as scheduled. The 
second scenario is that less than 35% of the loans are 
repaid by Year 6. As calculated in Appendix I, the maximum 
shortfall is only 5.86% which is a relatively small amount. 
The repayment can be solicited from a refinancing of this 
portion, involving the conversion of that portion of 
mortgage loans from Tranche A to Tranche B facility. The 
third scenario which may happen is that more than 35% of 
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the mortgage loans are repaid by Year 6. In this scenario, 
the excessive amount can be applied to prepay the Tranche 
B facility. 
Interest Margin 
In structuring the interest margin for the Securitisation 
Programme, the writer had interviewed a number of financial 
institutions and have obtained their indications of the 
preferred pricings. After discussions with these 
institutions, it is felt that the price levels as indicted 
in Chapter 工工工 would more or less reflect the general 
market reception. At this point, the writer would like to 
make the following supplementary comments. 
Firstly, under the capital-adequacy ratio requirement, loan 
assets which are backed up by residential properties will 
carry a risk-weighting of 50%, This means that in taking 
the exercise to determine whether a bank/financial 
institution has sufficient capital base to support the 
lending activities, residential mortgage loans will require 
only half of the capital as required in the case of a clean 
loan or a loan secured by non-residential property. Put 
this in another way, if a particular bank/financial 
institution is looking for a certain interest return (say, 
1%) to justify whether to lend in a particular case, and if 
the loan is supported by a residential mortgage, then the 
interest margin will be treated to be doubled, i.e. 2%, in 
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making the capital adequacy consideration. Hence, in the 
Securitisation Programme, the "effective" interest margin 
will be considered to be 1.5% and 0.4% in Tranche A and 
Tranche B respectively. 
Recently Bank of England has revised the risk-weighting of 
residential mortgage loans from 50% to 100%. The above 
consideration will therefore not be valid anymore. 
However, the writer is informed from the market that 
discussions are being held with Bank of England, with the 
hope that the risk-weighting is to be returned to the 50% 
level. 
Another point to note is that the initiating bank will 
continue to perforin the loan administrative routines, such 
as collection of payment, handling customers» enquiries, 
computer record maintenance/updating, and where necessary, 
take legal actions against the borrowers who have 
defaulted. Therefore, the investors will simply provide 
the funds, take a very minimal level of administration, and 
comfortably make the profit. In other words, the interest 
margin would more or less represent the net profit that the 
transaction is generating. 
From the perspective of the initiating bank, the pricing of 
the Tranche A portion of the Programme on HIBOR-base will 
mean that the initiating bank will be facing the risk that 
HIBOR rate may go higher than the Prime rate; consequently, 
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the SPV will be paying more interest expense, under Tranche 
A, than the relevant interest income received. 
Notwiths tandingly, when we look at the table shown in 
Appendix II, we can see that since 1988, the Prime rate has 
been almost always over the HIBOR rate, and hence the 
abovementioned risk is practically low in the long run. 
Fees 
In considering levels of compensation, the writer considers 
that securitisation carries more placement risk and 
requires more structuring than a plain debt issue. Because 
it takes assets off the balance sheet of the initiating 
bank and releases scarce capital, securitisation is often 
regarded as an alternative to raising additional share 
capital. For this reason, it carries fees which reflect 
its quasi-equity nature but are less than for pure equity 
underwriting with its particular market risks. 
The suggested compensation package consists of an Advisory 
fee of 0.375% and a Placement fee of 0.625% based on the 
face amount raised. Much of this placement fee will in 
fact have to be passed on to investors and will therefore 
reduce the coupon that must be paid by the SPV. when 
compared with the market practice, the fee level is 
considered to be appropriate given the time and effort that 
will be required to structure the issue and arrange 
placement in the market. A securitisation is practically 
different from conventional debt financing because of the 
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numerous additional parties and, consequently, more complex 
documentation issues that are sometimes involved. 
Notwithstanding the above, it should be noted that like 
other types of financings, the structure and documentation 
related to the Securitisation Programme will be fairly 
standardised, once the initial pioneering programme is 
finalised. Therefore, the costs for the subsequent 
launching will be considerably reduced due to the benefits 
of economy of scale. 
Credit Enhancement 
At this stage, the Securitisation Programme is 
substantially in good shape - - with the exception of 
credit enhancement. Strictly speaking, credit enhancement 
is not necessarily required, because there is already a 
cushion implicated in each individual loan in terms of the 
loan/security ratio. However, as the Securitisation 
Programme is a new concept, any type of credit enhancement 
will certainly enhance the success in launching the 
Programme. Essentially, there are a few types of credit 
enhancement as follows:-
(1) Over-collateralisation 
The concept of over-collateralisation means that on 
the date of first launching, a Securitisation 
Programme of say, HKD4 00 million, will consist of a 
total loan outstanding of HKD440 million so that there 
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is a 10% over- collateralisation. However, the writer 
has inquired about this issue with a number of 
accounting professionals, and their general opinion is 
that such arrangement would imply that the originating 
bank is selling the loan assets at a discount, and 
hence the over-collateralisation portion of HKD40 
million will have to be written-off on "Day 1" (i.e. 
the date of launching) . Obviously, this is not 
acceptable by the initiating bank, as there will be an 
immediate adverse impact on the profit and loss 
- 广•‘ 
position for the period. 
(2) Creation of a Spread Account 
By receiving a higher interest margin from the end 
borrowers and then paying a lower interest margin to 
those investors in the Securitisation Programme, the 
initiating bank is making a comfortable "skim-income" 
out of this Programme. To provide a credit 
enhancement, the initiating bank can set aside a 
portion of such skim-income, on a monthly basis, into 
a special account (the "Spread Account") until the 
balance in such account will have built up to a 
certain percentage (say 10%) of the loan outstanding 
in the portfolio. The idea is a feasible solution; 
the only drawback is that the build up of the Spread 
Account to a comfortable cushion will take time, 
during which there is no credit enhancement available. 
In particular, such period will be during the time 
香 港 中 文 大 學 圖 當 馆 藏 贵 ！ 
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when the investors have just joined the Programme at 
the initial stage, and when they have no time yet to 
observe the performance of the portfolio to build up 
necessary confidence. 
3• Insurance Credit 
An insurance policy can be arranged to cover the 
default risk of the mortgagors (i.e. the borrowers). 
This is a fairly common practice in the U.S. and 
Australian market. The writer has interviewed a 
number of insurance brokers/companies and enquired 
their interests in such kind of insurance. 
Surprisingly, their interests are close to none. 
During the discussion, they have all pointed out that 
their concerns are centred on the 1997 issue, in which 
should the political environment turn to an absolute 
adversity, then the Hong Kong majority may have no 
interests in buying properties, which will lead to a 
collapse in the property market. Therefore the 
insurance policy will not cover property default risk 
at all, but rather it is covering a sovereignty risk 
indeed. As the 1997 issue is unique to the Hong Kong 
market, these insurers are not confident enough even 
to quote a price. 
4. Arrangement of a Subordinated Loan 
A simple alternative can be provided in the form of a 
loan extended to the SPV, with such loan subordinated 
to the investors‘ interests. The loan amount is again 
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an arbitrary figure which should be sufficient to 
provide the level of confidence as required. 
Generally speaking, a 10% margin is consideired to be 
a fair amount. The subordinated loan can be provided 
by the initiating bank, but according to the Banking 
Commissioner, if the Securitisation Programme is to 
achieve an off-balance sheet effect (which is one of 
the major rationales for establishing the Programme in 
the first place) , the initiating bank has to treat the 
provision of the subordinated loan as an outright 
/r r 
capital deduction on Day 1. Again, this will somewhat 
defeat the purpose of launching the Programme. 
Nevertheless, a simple alternative is to ask a third 
party, e.g. another bank, to provide the subordinated 
loan to render such provision, this third party bank 
will be paid with a fee which, at today's market 
condition, a 0.1% flat on the loan amount will be 
considered appropriate. 
Source of Interest Payment and Principal Repayment 
Within the portfolio, each individual mortgage loan is 
having an independent, though similar, repayment schedule, 
with a monthly instalment consisting of an interest portion 
and a principal repayment portion. As each individual loan 
has its own repayment schedule, the initiating bank will in 
practice receive individual instalment almost every day. 
To match the monthly interest payment under the 
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Securitisation Programme, the daily instalments received 
will be paid into a designated account. On the date of 
interest payment (under Tranche A and Tranche B in the 
Securitisation Programme), the required amount will be paid 
from this designated account. The remaining balance will 
be retained to gradually build up a pool of say HKDIO 
million for early prepayment. During the time of building 
up the pool, the idle funds can be allowed to invest in 
short term, low risk assets (such as interbank deposits 
and/or first class risk grading corporate bonds). 





This study of the Securitisation Programme would not be 
complete without calculating the total cost of launching 
such a Programme. In this Chapter, the writer will 
endeavour to provide such a cost analysis. The 
calculations are based on the fact that as at 28 th 
February, 1991, the Prime rate for Hong Kong dollars is 
9.5% p.a. and the 1-month interbank rate ("HIBOR") is 
7.1875% p.a. The initiating bank is receiving interest on 
each individual mortgaged loan at a rate of 1.125% p.a. 
over Prime rate. At the same time, it is assumed that the 
total tenor of the Securitisation Programme is 10 years 
(after taking consideration of early prepayment)• In this 
respect, the calculation is as follows (all figures in Hong 
Kong Dollars with cents omitted): 
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(A) Amount Issued : 400,000,000 
(B) Principal : Year End Principal outstanding 
from Year 











(C) Total Interest : 251,052,224 
Income for 
the 10 years 
(D) Total Interest : 211,879,955 (please see 
Payment Appendix III) 
(E) Fees Paid : Advisory Fee (0.375%) : 1,500,000 
Placement Fee (0.625%): 2,500,000 
Total Fees Paid 4,000,000 
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(F) Fee for the : 254,268 
Subordinated 
Loan 
(G) Legal expenses : Given the complicated structure 
involved, the total legal fees 
for d o c u m e n t a t i o n and 
establishment cost for the 
Trustee is estimated to be around 
8,000,000 (equivalent to USDl - ‘�‘‘ 
million) 
Therefore, the total gross profit that the initiating bank 
can generate from a Securitisation Programme of HKD400 
million 
=[Total Interest Income for the 10 years (C)] 
minus [Total Interest Payment (D)] 
minus [Fees Paid (E)] 
minus [Fee for Subordinated Loan (F)] 
minus [Legal expenses (G)] 
=HKD26,918,001 
An economy of scale can be benefitted in the area of legal 
expenses, because to a certain extent, the legal fees will 
remain the same, regardless of the size of the issue. 
Another method of analysis is to use the Net Present Value 
consideration. The calculation is shown in 
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Appendix IV. Using a return rate of 10% p.a. , the Net 






After considering all the terms and structure, the 
Securitisation Programme as proposed in Chapter III can be 
revised/refined as follows: 
Revised Terms and Conditions 
Issuer : Special Purpose Vehicle ("SPV") 
Originator : A retail bank in Hong Kong with 
considerable level of activities 
in residential mortgage loan 
business 
Amount : HKD4 00 million 
Currency : HK Dollars 
Form of Facility : Mortgage backed term loan facility 
(the "Facility") transferable loan certificates 
28 
Tranches ： The Facility will be divided into 




HKD2 60 million 




Coupon : Tranche A 
0.75% over the Hong Kong Interbank 
Offered Rate ("HIBOR") 
Tranche B 
0.2% over the Prime Rate quoted by 
leading banks in Hong Kong from 
time to time 
Credit Enhancement : A subordinated loan, equal to 10% 
of the outstanding of the 
Programme, is to be provided 
Issue Price ： At Par 





Listing : None 
Arranger : A merchant bank in Hong Kong 
As discussed, one of the main rationales for the 
Securitisation Programme is to effectively off-load a 
substantial portion of the loan assets from appearing in 
the balance sheet. In order to achieve the off-balance 
sheet effect, Mr. John Aspden, the Commissioner of Banking, 
Hong Kong, has indicated that care should be taken in 
different area, the major issues of which are discussed, in 
the following paragraphs. 
In respect of the establishment and the shareholding 
structure of the SPV, attention must be paid to the legal 
position of "Subsidiaries" as defined by the 1990 Companies 
Act. Essentially the 1990 Companies Act states that "an 
undertaking is a subsidiary if the parent 
a) holds a majority of the voting rights 
b) holds shares and has the right to appoint or remove a 
majority of the directors 
c) has the right to direct the operating and financing 
policies of the undertaking by virtue of a control 
contract 
d) holds shares and controls a majority of the voting 
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rights through agreements with other shareholders 
e) holds a participating interest and either exercises a 
dominant influence or where the parent and the 
undertaking are managed on a unified basis.“ 
As seen, the definitions outlined above do not apply if the 
parent holds no shares in the vehicle, and off-balance 
sheet status can be achieved by avoiding any kind of 
shareholding relationship between the initiating bank and 
the SPV. In addition, Mr. Aspden stated that further 
广， 
relaxation is given in the sense that one staff from the 
originating bank is allowed to sit at the board of the SPV 
so as to look after the daily operations. However, the 
number is strictly restricted to one staff only. 
The provision of the subordinated loan is another area 
which needs attention. As discussed in Chapter IV, if an 
initiating bank wishes to, it can provide the subordinated 
loan as a form of credit enhancement. However, the amount 
so provided must be set aside as an outright capital 
deduction, otherwise the Banking Commissioner will see 
there is a close linkage between the initiating bank and 
the SPV, which ultimately will defeat the purpose of the 
Securitisation Programme to be considered as off-balance 
sheet treatment. 
In some similar Securitisation programmes launched in U.S. 
and U.K. markets, there are buy-back provision in which the 
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SPV shall have the right to redeem the loans and thereby 
cancel the Programme whenever the outstanding of the 
Programme falls below 10% of the original issue size. Such 
practice is permissible in Hong Kong as well, but the right 
of redemption should rest at the discretion of the SPV 
only. In technical terms, only a call option is considered 
legitimate in order to achieve the off-balance sheet 
effect. 
In the previous Chapter, the total gross profit that an 
. 广‘  
initiating bank can generate from a Securitisation 
Programme of HKD400 million is only HKD2 6.9 million, which 
is just a moderate figure. However, there should be other 
considerations as follows:-
1. As explained, the overall costs can be reduced because 
of economy of scale. The above calculation is in 
relation to the pioneer issue. After the first 
launching, subsequent issues will be more straight 
forward because of familiarisation. In addition, the 
relative cost, in terms of percentage to size, for the 
first launching can also be improved if the size of 
issue is increased. 
2. Apart from the economic consideration, there are other 
benefits brought by the Securitisation Programme. For 
example, such Programme will help to improve the 
liquidity/risk ratio of the initiating bank, which is 
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becoming a more imminent concern for quite a number of 
banks. The Securitisation Programme will also "free" 
the capital for other more profitable investments. 
3. Although this study only focuses on the securitisation 
of residential mortgage loans, a similar 
securitisation programme could be arranged in relation 
to other banking products such as credit cards, car-
loans and other short-term receivables. Once the 
market is receptive to the whole scheme, 
securitisation programmes in general will become a 
very active and specialised type of banking activity. 
All in all, the Securitisation Programme is a feasible and 
economically profitable solution to solve the 
liquidity/risk ratio for the banks concerned. with the 
international standard of practices and connections in the 
Hong Kong banking sector, the Programme is ready to take 
off. It worked in the U.S., U.K. and Australian markets. 
It will show that it can also work in Hong Kong. 
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APPENDIX III 
APPORTIONMENT OF THE MORTGAGE LOAN PORTFOLIO 
TO TRANCHE A AND TRANCHE B 
In apportioning the portfolio, the following figures and/or 
assumptions are employed:-
Total portfolio amount : HKD424,500,000 
广， 
Terms of maturity at ： 15 years 
date of loan inception 
Remaining tenor at date : 13 years 
of Securitisation Programme 
Applicable interest rate : 11.25% p.a. 
(1-25% p.a. over Prime 
rate, assumed to be 10% 
p.a.) 
Portfolio outstanding at : HKD400,081,260•60 
date of Securitisation 
Programme 
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Principal outstanding : HKD282,508,500.50 
6 years after date of 
Securitisation Programme 
Principal repayment for : HKD116,572,760•10 
the first 6 years of 
the Securitisation 
Programme 
Relevant percentage ： 29•14% 
This is the Principal portion which can be allocated to 
Tranche A. Taking a conservative consideration of the 
amount of loans prepaid during the period, the portion 
allocated to Tranche A could be around 35% of the entire 
Securitisation Programme amount. 
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APPENDIX III 
A COMPARISON OF THE HK DOLLAR 
PRIME RATE AND THE 1-MONTH HIBOR RATE 
SINCE JANUARY 1988 
January 1988 to September 1990 
one-month 
HIBOR (as 
of 10th day 
of each 
HKD Prime calender month) (A)-(B) 
1988 8 Jan 5.50 0.2500 5.2500 
10 Feb 5.25 2.7500 2.5000 
10 Mar 6.00 3.5000 2.5000 
8 Apr 6.00 4.1250 1.8750 
10 May 7.50 6.5000 1.0000 
10 Jun 7.50 7.4375 0.0625 
8 Jul 8.50 7.6250 0.8750 
10 Aug 8,50 8.8125 -0.3125 
9 Sept 9.50 8.1250 1.3750 
10 Oct 9.50 7.6250 1.8750 
10 Nov 9.50 7.8125 1.6875 
9 Dec 10.00 8.9375 1.0625 
1989 10 Jan 10.00 8.9375 1.0625 
13 Feb 10.50 9.9375 0.5625 
10 Mar 11.00 10.3750 0.6250 
10 Apr 11.50 11.0000 0.5000 
10 May 11.50 10.5625 0.9375 
9 Jun 11.50 12.2500 -0.7500 
10 Jul 10.50 9.8125 0.6875 
10 Aug 10.00 8.6875 1.3125 
8 Sept 10.00 9.5000 0.5000 
10 Oct 10.00 8.7500 1.2500 
10 Nov 10.00 8.3125 1.6875 
8 Dec 10.00 8.7500 1.2500 
1990 10 Jan 10.00 8.3125 1.6875 
9 Feb 10.00 8.3125 1.6875 
9 Mar 10.00 8.5000 1.5000 
9 Apr 11.00 9.6875 1.3125 
10 May 11.00 9.3750 1.6250 
8 Jun 11.00 9.5000 1.5000 
10 Jul 11.00 9.0625 1.9375 
10 Aug 11.00 7.8750 3.1250 
10 Sept 10.50 7.9375 2.5625 
10 Oct 10.50 8.3125 2.1875 
9 Nov 10.00 7.6250 2.3750 
10 Dec 10.00 7.8750 2.1250 
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1991 10 Jan 10.00 7.6875 2.3125 
11 Feb 9.50 6.4375 3.0625 




TOTAL INTEREST PAID UNDER 
THE SECURITISATION PROGRAMME 
Principal 
Outstanding Interest 
Year End fHKD) rHKD) 
1 376,260,804 35,254,370 
2 349,872,790 32,977,811 � 
3 320,540,403 30,447,234 
4 287,935,109 27,634,296 
5 241,691,718 24,053,333 
6 211,404,291 20,577,638 
7 166,621,596 17,168,282 
8 116,842,050 12,873,679 
9 61,508,104 8,099,884 




Interest Rate for Tranche A : HIBOR + 0.75% 
=7.9375% p.a. 
Interest Rate for Tranche B : Prime + 0.2% 
=9.7% p.a. 
Issued Size : HKD4 00 million divided 
into: 
Tranche A = HKD14 0 
million 
Tranche B = HKD2 60 
million 
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